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The Demand for Redistribution: 
A Test on Hungarian Data*
ISTVÁN GYÖRGY TÓTH**
Tárki Social Research Institute, Budapest
Abstract: Rational choice theories of the size of government would predict 
larger demand for redistribution (and, as a consequence, a higher level of re-
distribution) in more unequal representative democracies operating under 
conditions of majority voting. To explain the actual mismatch between the 
distribution of incomes and preferences, the logic of pure self-interest can be 
reﬁ ned by introducing past mobility experience and future mobility expecta-
tions. In addition, ideological attitudes and values (for example, about the 
role of individual responsibility in society) are in this respect also assumed to 
deﬁ ne general welfare attitudes. This article looks at the explanations of the 
actual intensity of the demand for redistribution in a transition country that 
shows high levels of support for various state activities while not showing an 
extremely high level of inequalities.
Keywords: inequality aversion, subjective mobility, demand for redistribu-
tion, welfare attitudes 
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Introduction
The assumption that demand for redistribution highly correlates with income 
levels is widely held, often tested, and sometimes questioned. As for the nature 
and direction of the assumed relationship between the distribution of incomes 
and the level of redistribution in a given country, disagreements are even more 
frequent. Rational theories of the size of government, for example, predict higher 
demand for redistribution in more unequal representative democracies operat-
ing under conditions of majority voting. However, the empirical evidence seems 
to be mixed in this respect: some countries with larger initial inequalities do not 
necessarily have a higher level of redistribution and countries with a high level 
of redistribution, may have very different levels of inequalities.1 Macro devia-
* I would like to thank three anonymous reviewers for their very useful comments. All 
remaining errors are my own. 
** Direct all correspondence to: István György Tóth, director, Tárki Social Research Insti-
tute, Budapest, Budaörsi út 45. H-1112, e-mail: toth@tarki.hu
1 Bénabou [1996] ﬁ nds very little evidence of this relationship, while Milanovic [2000] 
ﬁ nds support for the initial inequality-redistribution relationship. For a review of the rel-
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tions from micro predictions may be due to motivational, cognitive, and general 
ideological reasons.
Motivational explanations are generally based on self-interest (often meas-
ured by the actual income situation of citizens/survey respondents). However, 
it may also be that self-interest, shaded by past mobility experience and future 
mobility expectations on the one hand and by estimations of assumed gains from 
potential redistribution on the other hand, and along with risk-taking and risk-
averse attidues, all play a role. Cognitive factors will result in inaccurate estimates 
of a person’s own relative income position compared to others. Finally, ideologi-
cal preconceptions, values, and attitudes are also assumed to deﬁ ne general at-
titudes towards redistribution. 
The article is organised as follows. It begins with a rough overview of the 
theoretical literature on attitudes towards redistribution and then proceeds to 
deﬁ ne the demand for redistribution and present the data source. In the next sec-
tion, socio-economic determinants, conditional preferences and subjective mo-
bility are analysed as possible explanatory factors behind the changing levels of 
demand for redistribution, and this is followed by a presentation of the results of 
a multivariate analysis. The article closes with a short summary.
Theoretical context
The demand for redistribution under majority voting systems is often linked to 
the extent of inequalities in various countries. The Meltzer and Richard para-
digm (hereafter MR; Meltzer and Richard [1981]), for example, would predict that 
greater inequality leads to higher social spending. An increase in inequality is 
deﬁ ned by the increased distance between the median and the average incomes, 
when individuals differ in their productivity and hence also in terms of their in-
comes. If the median voter is the same as the person with median incomes, on the 
assumption of self-interest, he or she would certainly prefer bigger redistribution 
(higher taxes) than a person with an income above the median would. This would 
imply a higher level of redistribution in countries with greater inequalities. How-
ever, as empirical tests have shown (most recently reviewed in Borck [2007]), the 
evidence is very mixed to say the least. 
Below I try to outline two different types of arguments to account for the dif-
ferences. On the one hand, explanations based on self-interest may be enhanced 
by taking into account subjective evaluations of past individual mobility and fu-
ture expectations. On the other hand, incorporating the fact that people have var-
ying overall ideological commitments and value systems may produce a different 
path of explanations. Broadly, these are the two paths we will be dealing with in 
evant literature, see Borck [2007]. For more on levels of inequalities in OECD countries, see 
OECD [2008] and for more on European countries, see Tóth (ed.) [2008]. 
István György Tóth: The Demand for Redistribution
1065
this article, while explicitly acknowledgeing the fact that there are a number of 
other theoretical considerations that are not adequately addressed here.2 
When trying to account for deviations from the MR model, scholars point 
out that people, when evaluating their own current material circumstances, are 
a part of their own stories, including the story of the direction of recent changes 
in their own economic circumstances, their particular knowledge and beliefs, or 
their expectations for their fortunes in life. Therefore, it is not only current social 
status and current material circumstances but also the change in social status 
(whether actual or perceived, in the past or in the future) that may play a role in 
deﬁ ning redistributive preferences. 
The most straightforward is the case for the past mobility of individuals. 
Picketty [1995] in an early article, derived the demand for redistribution from 
the experience of social mobility. Alesina and La Ferrara [2005] stress the impor-
tance of actual social mobility (estimated on the basis of long-term panel studies) 
as a source of deviation from predictions determined from the income position 
of respondents (voters). Besides past experiences, future expectations can also 
deﬁ ne redistributive preferences. For example, redistributive desires of less afﬂ u-
ent citizens (below-median voters) may be driven not only by their actual level 
of income but also by their expectations about the likely improvement of their 
situation (and their chances to ris above the median) in the future. Bénabou and 
Ok [2001] developed a formal model of the relationship between redistributive 
claims and the prospect of upward mobility (they call it the POUM model). They 
argue that low-income (below median) people may reject redistribution if they 
expect an improvement in their position, while some currently rich people (or 
at least some of those above the median), if they are facing challenges of income 
deterioration, may have good reasons to vote for keeping redistribution arrange-
ments in place. Tests of these hypotheses have shown positive results. Ravallion 
and Lokshin [2000], for example, found in 1996 that a very high proportion of 
Russians favoured redistribution, including some of the rich. 
2 Corneo and Grüner [2002], for example, have noted the empirical relevance of the as-
sumption that when people reveal their preferences about levels of redistribution, they 
may also be following non-egoistic motives (the well-being of others may be part of their 
own utility functions). Corneo and Grüner call this the ‘public values effect’, while Fong 
[2001] observes the inﬂ uence of social preferences (depending on how the agents perceive 
determinants of poverty and afﬂ uence in their societies: do they associate bad luck or lack 
of effort with poverty). Other arguments in the literature are that there could be speciﬁ ca-
tion aspects not adequately addressed in the models. For example, it could easily be that 
both the concepts of ‘taxes’ and ‘redistribution’ are terms that are too broad and cannot be 
evaluated independently of their distributional consequences. Instead it could be expected 
that certain kinds of inequalities would induce a demand for certain kinds of expendi-
tures. Moene and Wallerstein [2001], for example, ﬁ nd that increased inequalities lead to 
increased support for people who are employed, but not necessarily for people who are 
currently out of the labour market. 
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In a more general context, the opinion respondents formulate may also be 
based on a general evaluation of the opportunities for social mobility that they as-
sociate with the system they live in. In this respect, the belief in the fair operations 
of the economic system is assumed to contribute to a smaller demand for redistri-
bution [Fong 2001; Alesina and La Ferrara 2005]. The factors attributed to getting 
ahead in society and the rules of social mobility actually perceived as ‘fair’ also 
matter. Picketty [1995] and Fong [2001] found that beliefs about what are the de-
terminants of individual success (whether it is effort or luck that leads to higher 
positions) are signiﬁ cant predictors of the demand for redistribution. Those who 
see social mobility less in terms of merits and efforts will accept greater inequali-
ties and will demand less redistribution than those who believe that success is 
just a matter of luck.3 
On a more general level, a popular and very inﬂ uential theoretical interpre-
tation ascribes, for example, the more widespread acceptance of large inequalities 
in America to an overall acceptance of the vision of the ‘American dream’. Ac-
cording to this assertion, the belief that the New World is the land of opportunity 
may have made Americans more tolerant of inequalities than Europeans, who 
were faced with more social constraints on personal mobility. 
Alesina, Di Tella and MacCulloch [2004] found that inequality has a differ-
ent impact on Europeans (their happiness is reduced by inequalities) and Ameri-
cans (for whom the relationship is much less signiﬁ cant, if at all). However, this 
is not without differentiation across various social groups: while in America the 
happiness of all four segments they analyse (poor-rich and left-right) seem un-
affected by inequalities, in Europe the poor and the left show a strong negative 
aversion to inequality.4 In addition, the authors conclude, this transatlantic differ-
ence does not originate in the different preferences of Europeans and Americans, 
but, rather, in the different perceptions of opportunities for mobility in the US 
and in European welfare states (that is, people’s conﬁ dence that social mobility 
is an option for everyone will lead them to press less for much more redistribu-
tion).5 
3 Related to this, a growing portion of the literature underlines ethnic aspects of cross-
national differences in social expenditures. Alesina and Glaeser [2006] and Glaeser [2005] 
ﬁ nd ethnic heterogeneity (and widespread associations of welfare beneﬁ ts to ethnic 
groups) to be the reason for the limited of the American welfare state as compared to the 
extensive European welfare states. 
4 However, Glaeser [2005] underlines that the remarkable stability of American political 
institutions (at least compared to the European institutions in the 20th century) and the 
success of leftist indoctrination in Europe compared to the success of rightist indoctrina-
tion in the US may have led to more widespread intolerance for inequalities and a stronger 
demand for the welfare state in Europe. 
5 Osberg and Smeeding [2006] argue that it is not the evaluations of income differences as 
such but the different attitudes towards the unfortunate at the bottom end of the income 
scale that make a difference on the two sides of the Atlantic. Americans tend to ignore 
poverty more than Europeans. Furthermore, Bratsberg et al. [2006] have shed new light 
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General risk aversion may also play an important role in determining 
demand for redistribution. Welfare policies in general constitute an insurance 
against uncertain future contingencies in private life (risk of illness, job loss, de-
creased working capacity in old age, child-raising costs, etc.). When forming their 
opinions about redistribution, individuals may follow the reasoning suggested 
by John Rawls [1971], who argues that rational actors behind ‘the veil of igno-
rance’ (that is, uncertain future positions in an unequal world) will choose the 
minimax strategy to minimise possible welfare risks. 
‘Comparison incomes’ (that is, when individuals subjectively contrast their 
own income with that of others rather than with past personal experiences or 
future personal expectations) can also drive redistributive preferences. As people 
compare typical cases or groups with each other, based on some knowledge of 
their material positions, the basis for evaluations may be comparisons of their 
own positions with others or comparisons of other citizens or groups of citizens 
with each other. Senik [2005] has reviewed a great deal of empirical evidence and 
found that studies on ‘comparison incomes’ in the Netherlands, Germany, the UK 
and the US show negative signs (that is, the larger the gap between a person’s own 
income and that of the reference group, the less satisﬁ ed a person will be with his 
or her income and life prospects). However, she also reports on studies in transi-
tion countries like Hungary, Russia, Poland or the Baltic countries, which shows 
positive correlations with reference incomes: the higher an individual’s income-
reference income gap was, the higher the person’s satisfaction with his or her 
own income was. Part of the explanation may lie in the fact that these data refer 
to the relatively early stages of the transition, when the expectations about a fast 
improvement in living standards were stronger [Senik 2006]. This may also mean 
that they were (at the time of the surveys) also in the early stages of the ‘tunnel ef-
fect’, a term coined by Albert Hirschman [1973], arguing that the income growth 
of others may induce optimism in us even if we are still in a stagnant phase. The 
transformation of optimism into bitter frustration, depending on the length of 
period spent waiting for better times, may explain the differences between the 
experiences of transition countries in different phases of development.
Other analysts argue that certain deviations from the MR prediction can 
be derived from the complex nature of the human motivations involved in these 
public policy issues [Lübker 2007; Wong 2004] In addition to pecuniary motives, 
human conduct may also be driven by preferences embedded in the general 
value systems that people endorse. Egalitarian attitudes lead to criticism of the 
reward system of market economies and a preference for redistribution to correct 
these failures. Also, systems with strong egalitarian features may be criticised 
on ‘American exceptionalism’ by examining a great deal of empirical literature on it. They 
show that Nordic intergenerational mobility patterns are more turbulent than those in 
UK mobility indices, which in turn show higher mobility rates than those in the US. They 
argue that, therefore, the belief in greater American mobility may be a popular myth.
Sociologický časopis/Czech Sociological Review, 2008, Vol. 44, No. 6
1068
by the actors involved as systems that put too little stress on merit-related re-
wards. In other words, in certain regimes (like the transition countries experienc-
ing the move from communism to a capitalistic social order) the moral authority 
of the free market may form the basis for inequality evaluations [Kelley and Za-
gorski 2004].
Studies on the legitimation of welfare states assumes that people have aes-
thetic preferences for certain arrangements in the social fabric, that is, they also 
derive guidance from ideological value systems when forming their opinion on 
welfare state expenditures. In some studies, the larger demand for redistribution 
is also attributed to cultural values and to socialisation (especially in the case of 
the post-transition countries). Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln [2005] and Suhrcke 
[2001] both ﬁ nd a signiﬁ cant effect for the East-West dummy variable when re-
gressed on inequality or redistribution preferences.6 Gijsberts [2002] also point 
out that observed differences in inequality aversion between market economies 
and the former state socialist countries are not due to differences in the social 
structure, but, rather, to socialisation and values. A large part of the sociological 
literature argues that social status determines a great deal of the individual con-
tingencies that can serve as a background to stronger or weaker state preferences. 
Svallfors [1997], for example, shows that, while the level of support is related to 
welfare regimes, they are of little use in explaining group differences in welfare 
attitudes. Instead, class divisions and gender explain differing attitudes towards 
the welfare state across various welfare regimes. However, as social status in itself 
cannot explain time series changes or cross-country differences (which remain 
there even after controlling for different socio-economic differences), a continued 
search for other possible explanations for attitude differences is warranted. 
The rest of this article focuses on trying to uncover the determinants of re-
distributive attitudes by concentrating on two different directions of theoretical 
propositions set out above. On the one hand, an attempt will be made to extend 
the ‘self-interest’ model towards subjective evaluations of past experiences and 
future expectations. On the other hand, an effort will be made to identify the role 
of general ideological commitments in shaping redistribution preferences. 
Data and methods
This article tests the determinants of the demand for redistribution on Hungarian 
data. As far as the ‘real’ redistribution trends are concerned, Hungary represents 
the kind of transition, in which the reforms started relatively early (reform efforts 
date back to the mid-1980s), and partly owing to this for a long time it seemed 
like a front-runner. At the same time, inequalities, though they increased signiﬁ -
6 However, some have questioned the existence of a ‘socialist legacy’ in deﬁ ning commit-
ments to lower levels of inequality, especially in the case of CIS countries [Murthi and 
Tiongson 2008]. 
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cantly, did not explode as much as in many other transition countries, and around 
2005 Hungary ranked in the middle of a European ‘league table’ of inequalities 
[Tóth 2005; Tóth 2008]. However, there is a relatively high level of inequality aver-
sion and a relatively low level of legitimation of the newly experienced income 
distribution [Tóth 2006]. Both of these can reasonably be expected to be behind 
the increase in demand for redistribution after the systemic change. Successive 
governments followed a strategy (to some extent similar to the strategies followed 
in other Central and Eastern European Countries) of extending the scope of so-
cial policies to help smooth the process of structural adjustments [Vanhuysee 
2006]. Partly as a result of this, the deﬁ cit grew throughout the electoral cycle, 
exhibiting peaks around elections, which points to the political-economy origins 
of growing macro-economic imbalances [Palócz 2008]; as parties responded to 
growing demands for redistribution (though they also contributed to boost-
ing expectations). This context renders it especially interesting to explain what 
drives the consistently high demand for redistribution in Hungary.7 However, 
the aim here is not to explain Hungary’s budget deﬁ cits. Instead, the objective 
is to test theoretical assumptions about the relationship between various socio-
economic factors and redistributive attitudes, with Hungary taken as just an 
example. 
The data used in this analysis are drawn from the 2003 wave of the Tárki 
Household Monitor survey, which covered (as usual in the history of this series) 
two thousand households. The survey questionnaire contained a detailed block 
of questions on welfare attitudes, in addition to the traditional income and labour 
market question blocks.8 To measure the demand for redistribution, an index of 
pro-state attitudes was created, derived from a set of questions on state involve-
ment in various traditional areas. Table 1 shows the index’s elementary question 
items, together with the frequency distributions of the responses to these ques-
tions. 
The ‘predicted variable’ (the demand for redistribution index) is derived 
from answers to the above questions. The index is created as the sum of z-scores 
on the responses to the role of the state and markets in job creation, free education, 
health and social expenditures, housing and agricultural subsidies. The resulting 
index has an expected value of 0 and a variance equal to 1. This helps deﬁ ne the 
intensity of the demand for redistribution, as the value of it will depend on the 
7 The continuous accumulation of public budget deﬁ cits inevitably led to a severe auster-
ity package in 2006, more in the character of tax increases than expenditure cuts in 2006 
[Palócz 2008]. However, the effects of this are outside the scope of this article, as the data 
used here were collected right after the honeymoon period with the socialist government 
that was elected in 2002 and the announcement of large social expenditure increases in the 
ﬁ rst period of the electoral cycle. 
8 Tárki Household Monitor is a cross-section of 2000 Hungarian households. Respondents 
include all 16+ persons in the household. Data for 18+ respondents are used in this survey. 
For more on the survey see Szivós and Tóth [2008].
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relative position of the individual in the joint distribution of various pro-state 
variables. The further away an individual is from the centre of the distribution, 
the higher the (positive or negative) value of the index. For OLS regressions, this 
sum is predicted. In the bivariate analysis the actual average values by categories 
are shown.9 
9 An alternative way of computing the index would have been to begin with principal 
components extractions. However, as the resulting two components (the items for tuition 
fees and housing seemed to behave differently from the rest) was fairly balanced and the 
omission of any items would have resulted in two big information losses, I decided to keep 
the simple summing up of the values of relative positions (z-scores). However, the Corn-
Table 1.  The demand for redistribution: agreement with dichotomous trade-off 
questions on the role of the state and the market (Hungary, in %)
A: Redistributive option B: Market option Total
Unconditional A 
(4)
Rather A
(3)
Rather B
(2)
Unconditional B 
(1)
It is the duty of the state to provide 
jobs for the unemployed
Solving employment problems should 
be left to the market
46 36 13 5 100
The state has the duty to provide 
higher education for the young, with-
out tuition fees
Education is an investment, and high 
quality university services can only be 
ensured with tuition fees
50 32 12 6 100
An important task of the state should 
be to spend more on health, education 
and social expenditures
Reducing taxes should be more impor-
tant, even if less remains for health, 
education and social expenditures
56 30 9 5 100
The housing problems faced by young 
people can only be solved with state-
supported construction
The young should solve their own 
housing problems, the state should 
only become involed through favour-
able mortgages and tax breaks
21 20 29 30 100
Agricultural production should be 
supported by the state: without it pro-
ducers would have difﬁ culty surviving
Agricultural products are just like 
products in other sectors: agricultural 
producers should also have to survive 
under market terms
38 37 17 8 100
Source: Tárki Household Monitor survey, 2003.
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When trying to ﬁ nd correlates, our assumption is that the demand for re-
distribution will depend on 1) the economic self-interest of the respondents as 
measured by objective material variables, 2) subjective evaluations of past mobil-
ity experiences and future mobility prospects, 3) the degree of risk aversion of 
the respondents, 4) the general attitude of the respondents about the role of indi-
viduals in securing safe economic positions for themselves and for their families, 
and 5) the respondents’ evaluation of the level of tolerable inequalities. When 
controlling for the major socio-economic background variables, like gender, age, 
education, and place of residence, it is hypothesised that these factors exert an 
inﬂ uence.
Objective material position (direct economic self-interest) is proxied by two 
variables. A person’s (objective) income position is measured by personal equiv-
alent incomes (net disposable household incomes adjusted by family size10). It 
could be expected that lower incomes would correspond to higher redistributive 
claims. Labour market status is represented by a variable used as a proxy for de-
pendence on existing redistributive arrangements: pensioners and inactives rely 
to a great extent on pensions or other types of beneﬁ ts from the state.
Variables on subjective mobility (experiences and expectations) include ex-
perienced (subjective) income mobility, with the expectation that downward mo-
bility will result in higher redistributive claims, while upward subjective mobil-
ity will be associated with a lower demand for redistribution. This is measured by 
responses to a question in which people evaluated the current material status of 
their family and their status a decade earlier on a ten-point social scale. Mobility 
perceptions are calculated as the differences between these values. Expectations 
about (subjective) social mobility are expected to have a negative relationship 
with demand for redistribution. The higher the expected mobility of the person 
is, the less likely it is that the person will be in favour of redistribution, should 
other things remain equal.11 
Among personal attitudes about individual responsibility, two different as-
pects are distinguished. The ﬁ rst is the general opinion on the role of individual 
efforts and social responsibilities in shaping one’s fortune. This was measured 
with a self-ranking on a four-value scale measuring commitment to full respon-
sibility for someone’s own fate versus the claim that the state should take more 
bach alpha is not very high (somewhat less than .43). Still, as this measure is intended to 
reﬂ ect a general attitude to greater or less state involvement, we have to list a broad range 
of potential state measures in the index (just like the situations voters face in actual elec-
tions).
10 The equivalence elasticity is e=0.73, a value that ﬁ ts well with the implicit elasticities 
used in the Hungarian social policy system. It is more restrictive than the assumption of 
per capita incomes, but allows less economies of scale than the OECD I or OECD II scales 
[Tóth 2005]. 
11 Respondents were asked to assess their satisfaction with their income prospects in the 
coming year. 
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responsibility in caring for its citizens. The expectations are obvious: those com-
mitting themselves to a more individualistic view of personal responsibilities 
will reveal less intensive preferences for redistribution. The second aspect is risk 
aversion as a general attitude, measured by respondents’ choices between the op-
tion of secure employment with low gains and the option of high gains but risky 
employment in a hypothetical situation.12 It is expected that risk-averse individu-
als would show a higher demand for redistribution. 
With regard to tolerance of inequality, the evaluation of the actual level of 
inequalities is expected to have an impact in the demand for redistribution index. 
It is expected that it has a separate role in explaining the variance of the predicted 
variable in that the ‘stronger’ the agreement with the statement about actual in-
equalities in the country being ‘too high’, the higher the demand for redistribu-
tion will be. 
Personal characteristics like ‘age’ (six categories of ten-year age brackets for 
the age of respondents), ‘education’ (differentiating between respondents with 
less than primary education, vocational education, secondary education, or com-
plete higher education, with the latter group also including students currently 
attending higher education), ‘gender’ and ‘place of residence’ categories (three 
categories, differentiating between the capital, cities and rural areas). 
The next two sections present the bivariate results and some interactions 
and the multivariate parameter estimates for the effects of predictors on redis-
tributive preferences. 
The socio-economic correlates of redistributive claims 
We start the bivariate observation of the data by looking at the basic socio-eco-
nomic background variables. The general expectation is that socio-economic sta-
tus (represented by variables like incomes, labour market position, and demo-
graphic characteristics, most importantly age) and educational attainment play 
a primary role in deﬁ ning who becomes a stronger or weaker supporter of state 
redistribution. 
This assumption is partly supported by the available data. Education seems 
to be negatively correlated with the redistributive attitude index (Table 2). The 
value of the index is lower for people with more education and higher for people 
with less education. The relationship seems to be linear and quite strong. The 
same applies to incomes, which seem unequivocally negatively correlated with 
the value of the index. This is very much what we would expect and this is very 
12 The wording of the question was: Which option would you choose if someone made 
you two job offers: one job with a continuous, secure ﬂ ow of relatively lower income, or 
another job with considerable insecurity, promises of large gains, but a viable threat of big 
losses, too. 
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much what is assumed by public choice models. However, the pattern shown in 
Table 2 is clearly reminiscent of the glass-half-empty glass-half-full conundrum. 
The redistributive index by design shows the ‘intensity’ of state/market prefer-
ences of various sub-groups of society. Therefore, while the averages seem to 
Table 2.  The average value of the redistribution attitude index in various 
socio-economic groups, Hungary, 2003
Age group, years (F:7,1)
18–29 30–39 40–49 50–59 60–69 70 +
–30 –18 –27 –4 48 38
Gender (F:16,2)
Male Female
–23 14
Education level (F:49,4)
Primary or less Vocational Secondary Tertiary
87 –19 –49 –72
Settlement (F:20,7)
Village City Budapest
18 7 –71
Income, as a percentage of the population’s median income (F:26,8)
Below median 
50%
Median 
50%–80%
Median 
80%–120%
Median 
120%–200%
Above median 
200%
66 48 18 –50 –101
Employment status (F:23,4)
Employed Self-employed, 
entrepreneur
Unemployed Pensioner Other inactive
–34 –134 54 42 8
Subjective mobility (F:15,2)
Drastic fall Signiﬁ cant 
fall
Some fall Stable Improvement Large im-
provement
54 39 28 –16 –55 –117
Income prospects (F:39,2)
Not very good Fair Very good
60 –5 –53
*F statistics in brackets
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correspond to the expected direction of the relationship, this does not mean that, 
for instance, no high-income persons would vote for redistribution, and it can be 
supposed that there are also poor who reject redistribution. 
As far as generational differences are concerned, the age of respondents 
does not seem to show any linear connection to redistributive attitudes. Younger 
respondents expressed a lower level of redistributive preferences than older gen-
erations (with the dividing line somewhere around the effective retirement age 
in Hungary, i.e. 55–60 years of age). However, within these two broad age groups, 
it is possible to suspect that the differing extent of labour market participation of 
the different age cohorts has an effect. Entrepreneurs and the self-employed tend 
to be less supportive and pensioners and the economically inactive more sup-
portive of state redistribution. The economically inactive at the lower end of the 
age scale (students) may account for the non-linearities in the age distribution of 
redistributive preferences. 
As for gender differences, men tend to favour less redistribution than wom-
en. In terms of locality, people living in Budapest tend to favour redistribution 
less than villagers do. However, composition effects especially should be control-
led for. 
It is important to note here that the scale being used to measure redistri-
bution was deliberately designed to cover a broader range of activities well be-
yond vertical redistribution, which is conventionally deﬁ ned as a target area for 
welfare attitudes. The relatively higher rate of refusal higher rate of rejection of 
these measures not only means a rejection of social expenditures but is also the 
expression of some form of reservations towards the economic involvement of 
the state. 
From a glance at the values redistributive attitude index, grouped by cat-
egories of experienced and expected social mobility, a direct negative relation-
ship becomes apparent. Respondents reporting downward shifts in their material 
circumstances show signiﬁ cantly stronger redistributive preferences than those 
who evaluate their life course changes as more fortunate (see Table 2, bottom 
rows). 
However, it may well be that there are certain interactions between income 
levels and experiences or expectations about personal economic prospects that 
determine the intensity of state preferences. These types of interactions are il-
lustrated in Figure 1. 
Past mobility experience seems to correlate negatively with redistributive 
attitudes at each income level. This is represented by the fact that those who feel 
that their position has worsened considerably show stronger levels of redistribu-
tive preferences at each income level (including the highest). In turn this also 
means that even people who otherwise belong to the lower-income categories 
(with less than 80% of the median income) show less positive attitudes towards 
state redistribution if they report upward mobility in their immediate past (in 
contrast with people who belong to the same income category but have not expe-
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Figure 1.  Interactions between income level on the one hand and subjective mobility 
and income expectations on the other in shaping redistributive preferences
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rienced upward mobility). Conﬁ dence that income prospects will improve in the 
future also corresponds with a lower demand for redistribution: at higher income 
levels, this relationship is stronger. To be fair, although those with below median 
and above-median incomes do exhibit differences in their redistributive attitudes 
depending on their perceived mobility prospects, the lower income segments al-
ways remain on the positive side and the above-median segments always remain 
on the negative side of the redistribution index scales. Still, there are some excep-
tions: even those people who are well below the median-income level may on av-
erage opt for less redistribution if they rank among the upwardly mobile (that is, 
among those who report a signiﬁ cant improvement in their families’ material po-
sition in the past). Similarly, even those people who belong to an income category 
that has much higher income than the median may support some redistribution 
if they feel that they lost ground in the past or fear losing ground in the future. 
Also important is the evaluation of subjective mobility, which seems to mat-
ter more for middle-income categories than for the better off or the less well off. 
This differentiating impact is especially strong in the case of past subjective mo-
bility (although it appears also to be present in the case of expectations).
To put it differently: a decline or an improvement in perceived social mobil-
ity seems to lead to larger swings in demand for redistribution among the middle 
classes than among the poor or among the rich. 
In terms of general welfare attitudes (measured by the ideological question 
about an individual’s responsibility over his or her own fate versus the duty of 
the state to provide for various contingencies), the inclination to support state 
involvement seems to correlate with a higher level of demand for redistribution, 
while disagreement with the ‘inequalities are too large’ statement seems to cor-
respond to a lower level of support for the involvement of state solutions in the 
measured ﬁ elds that are the focus of this analysis (Table 3). Finally, risk-takers 
have much less of a taste for redistribution than risk-averse people do. 
Multivariate results 
Simple OLS regressions were used to predict the demand for redistribution in a 
multivariate context (Table 4). The ﬁ rst model shows a baseline containing ba-
sic socio-demographic variables (age, gender, education and place of residence). 
These variables are controlled for each consecutive model. Model 2 contains, in 
addition, two predictors representing immediate material self-interest: personal 
equivalent household incomes on the one hand, and the labour market activity of 
respondents on the other (both converted into dummies leaving middle incomes 
and employee status as references categories). In the third model a series of dum-
mies representing subjective past mobility experience and future expectations are 
introduced. The latter variable is the typical proxy of the POUM phenomenon, 
but given that future expectations are largely embedded in past experiences, the 
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ﬁ rst variable of past mobility experience is also grouped here. This set of vari-
ables is called the model for ‘extended self-interest’, as in addition to the immedi-
ate material circumstances, evaluations and expectations are also included. The 
fourth model introduces the variables about individualistic traits (risk aversion 
and individualistic attitude), while the ﬁ fth model introduces inequality aversion 
to show the separate effects of inequality tolerance on the demand for redistribu-
tion. Finally, the sixth is a full model containing all the variables. 
The OLS results show gradual improvements in the consecutive models, 
though the models in general do not perform very well (the adjusted R squares 
of the magnitude between 6% and 10% are all very low). The coefﬁ cients have the 
expected signs in each case but the magnitude and signiﬁ cance of the relation-
ships require comments. 
From the observation of the control variables in the base model, several im-
portant conclusions emerge. First and foremost, it is quite striking how important 
the role of education is in determining redistributive preferences. All coefﬁ cients 
are high and signiﬁ cant at a level of 1%. Since the reference category here is the 
group who have only primary or a lower level of education, it is safe to conclude 
that people with the lowest education are signiﬁ cantly more in favour of redistri-
bution than the other education categories. Also, it is important to note that the 
effect of place of residence remains strong in each of the models, suggesting that 
attitudes in the capital of the country are signiﬁ cantly different from those in the 
countryside, and these differences cannot be attributed just to composition ef-
fects (that is, to the large share of people who have a higher level of education in 
Budapest). Third, despite the fact that the dummies for age were constructed in 
considerable detail (to tackle potential non-linearities, with the 50–59 age group 
Table 3.  The average value of the redistributive attitude index by the level 
of inequality tolerance and by general ideological attitude*
Degree of agreement: ‘inequalities are too large in this country’ (F:23,4)
Full agreement Rather agrees Neither-nor Disagrees
25 –47 –99 –45
Preferences regarding individual versus collective responsibility for one’s own fate (F:43,8)
Individual 
responsibility
2 3 State 
responsibility
–20 –58 10 105
Risk attitude (F:40,5)
Risk-averse Risk-taker
10 –97
*F statistics in brackets
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designated as the reference category), no signiﬁ cant relationship was found. 
Gender differences in the base model are signiﬁ cant (men showing less taste for 
redistribution than women). However, these differences seem to evaporate in the 
consecutive models. These last two points support the conclusion that reliance 
on state redistribution relates more to socio-economic variables than to demo-
graphic ones. 
The introduction of the pure self-interest variables resulted in a weakening 
of the estimates for education, gender and place of residence, both in terms of 
signiﬁ cance and in terms of the magnitude of the parameter estimates (Mod-
el 2). The role of income appears to be important, though it seems that it is not 
low income that explains higher redistributive claims but the other way round: 
pro-market views seem to be concentrated mostly in the higher income groups. 
Similar can be said about the labour market status of the respondents. When con-
trasted with the attitudes of the employed, pensioners and people who are eco-
nomically inactive do not differ that much. Instead, the group of self-employed 
and entrepreneurs shows signiﬁ cantly less support for redistribution and state 
involvement in general than the reference group of employees. 
The introduction of past mobility experience and future expectations as pre-
dictors brings in some signiﬁ cant factors. The introduction of these two variables 
‘takes away’ some of the explanatory power of current incomes (though incomes 
retain their signiﬁ cance at a 5% level in this model, too). Past mobility experience 
appears to be inversely related to redistributive preferences, though somewhat 
asymmetrically: while even the experience of a slight decline is associated with a 
signiﬁ cantly stronger demand for redistribution, it is only a very strong increase 
(of at least three points on a scale of ten) that corresponds to a signiﬁ cantly lower 
level of redistributive tastes. The introduction of future mobility prospects does 
show a positive and signiﬁ cant effect on the demand for redistribution, all other 
things remaining constant. To sum up, the signs of the two subjective mobility 
variables are in line with our expectations: the better the past mobility experience 
was and the better the future prospects are, the less inclined a respondent will be 
to choose the statist option, further conﬁ rming the POUM hypothesis of Bénabou 
and Ok [2001].13 
In Model 4, both variables are signiﬁ cant and negative for individualistic 
socio-economic attitudes. The coefﬁ cients and signs of a risk-taking attitude and 
of the position on an individualism/paternalism scale support the interpretation 
that the more a respondent agrees that individuals (rather than the state) should 
have to bear responsibility for their lives, the lower their redistribution index will 
be. People with a risk-taking attitude in job-market decisions agree to statist op-
13 These ﬁ ndings are widely consistent with the ﬁ ndings of Molnár and Kapitány [2006, 
2007], who, based on a household budget survey, present a different analysis of the de-
mand for redistribution on Hungarian data. They ﬁ nd that redistributive preferences de-
pend on both objective and subjective conditions. Also, their ﬁ ndings support the POUM 
hypothesis and lead to the conclusion that inequality tolerance may be a major factor. 
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tions to a lesser extent. This effect seems to be fairly strong. It should be noted that 
adding these variables into the pure self-interest model increases the explained 
variance of the models more than the introduction of subjective the base variables 
did. Finally, inequality aversion, when introduced, shows a signiﬁ cant value and 
a positive sign, meaning that, all other things remaining constant, being dissatis-
ﬁ ed with the perceived level of income inequalities leads to a greater demand for 
redistribution.
Conclusion 
In this article, an attempt was made to explain attitudes towards redistribution 
in the Hungarian context. To perform this, data from the 2003 wave of the Tárki 
Household Monitor dataset was used. Several alternative explanations of redis-
tributive attitudes were tested in the article. In addition to conventional class 
differentials, the article revealed differences by various subjective evaluations of 
inequalities, differences in the level and change of estimates of relative personal 
positions, and differences by general individualistic attitudes. Rather than identi-
fying pro-state groups, the generally high level of popular support for state redis-
tribution makes it easier to identify those who were less in favour of state redistri-
bution: the entrepreneurs, the upper middle income strata and some subgroups 
of the higher educated are important representatives of this attitude. 
The article showed that demand for redistribution correlates negatively 
with actual (and perceived) incomes and with past mobility experiences. Expec-
tations for the future mobility of the respondents, although they are not overrid-
ing, add to the explanatory power of the models. People expecting improvements 
in their income situations are less in favour of the statist options, while those fac-
ing uncertainties in their personal future show more taste for redistribution. The 
ﬁ ndings of this article call for a broader understanding of self-interest and warn 
that it is necessary to detach it from actual, objective income levels and material 
positions. Perceptions of (levels of and changes to) actual incomes and conﬁ dence 
in the future development trajectories of respondents’ households play an im-
portant role. In other words, the belief that things will get better in the future 
decreases the redistributive expectations of even those who may be currently in 
need of help. This supports Bénabou’s and Ok’s POUM hypothesis [2001], which 
is another achievement of this article. 
Although, generally, paternalistic attitudes are important, the effect of the 
(in)tolerance for inequalities in deﬁ ning the demand for redistribution is also 
very signiﬁ cant. Therefore, it may well be that the lower tolerance for inequali-
ties deﬁ nes both the larger demand for redistribution and (to some extent) wide-
spread paternalistic attitudes, at least in the context of the transition from social-
ism to capitalism. The ﬁ ndings of this article fully support other recent ﬁ ndings 
on Hungarian attitudes. 
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The article also reached other conclusions. The ﬁ rst is related to the fact that 
we measured attitudes towards a broader range of state activities. This differs 
from most of the studies in the literature that measure the demand for redistribu-
tion with a single question about the need to redistribute to reduce the degree of 
inequalities. The measure used in this article includes items such as the labour 
market, housing, education, health and social policy interventions, and protec-
tionist agricultural policies. This helps produce a clearer understanding of the 
political economy of budget formation and electoral cycles than analyses based 
only on single questions about a call for a reduction of (vertical) income inequali-
ties. 
One very important ﬁ nding in this article is that education matters a great 
deal in explaining welfare attitudes. However, I would not conclude that the 
change in the shape of preferences (were this a policy target) could easily be 
achieved by educative campaigns. The fact that respondents’ answers correspond 
to their school attainment is most likely related to cultural differences within the 
electorate and to the fact that education is strongly correlated with economic af-
ﬂ uence. To put it differently, the lack of education may correspond to poverty and 
bad economic circumstances, which paves the way to more intensive pro-state 
attitudes. 
An important future research direction could be to relate actual govern-
ment spending levels to the spread of welfare attitudes and to the level of income 
(in)tolerance and to analyse actual levels of inequalities. This could help in de-
termining how redistributive demand, inequality aversion and actual inequality 
levels interrelate (especially in the context of post transition countries). 
Finally, another important ﬁ nding of the article is that middle-income 
groups seem to be more sensitive to perceived shifts in material position than bet-
ter-off or worse-off groups. This also has a policy consequence: welfare reforms 
aimed at decreasing the excess burden on the state should start by bargaining 
with the middle classes.14 
The ultimate test of attitudes is elections, which occur at periodic intervals. 
Clearly, voting rights can only be exercised in person, and at election time it is 
the act of voting that makes preferences visible. Therefore, turnout on elections 
becomes an important issue and differences in the political participation of the 
14 The traditional left-right dimension does not seem to have been working in the past ﬁ ve 
years in Hungary. For example, Fábián and Tóth [2008] found that while in 2003 the pro-
state and pro-market attitudes did somewhat correspond to ideological self-identiﬁ cation 
along these traditional lines, nowadays there has been a shift away from this pattern. Party 
preference came to be signiﬁ cant in explaining redistributive attitudes, but in an unusual 
way: leftist voters seem to support reformist, liberal measures, while the rightist part of 
the electorate is signiﬁ cantly more statist in its attitudes. The causes behind this change are 
certainly open to debate, because the question has yet to be answered as to whether people 
urge parties to redistribute more or parties try to gain votes by offering various promises 
of a free lunch.
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afﬂ uent and of the poorer segments of society [Bénabou 2000; Larcinese 2007] 
may lead to less (or more) redistribution than would be predicted from the MR 
model. After all, turnout plays a major role in deﬁ ning electoral outcome and, via 
that, public spending priorities. But this could be the topic of the next study on 
redistributive preferences.
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